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UNION MEMBERS' FREE SPEECH GUARANTEE: DOES IT
PROTECT AGAINST DISCHARGE FROM UNION OFFICE?
INTRODUCTION

A fundamental premise of American society is that free expression strengthens democratic institutions. This premise and the
disclosure of the widespread denial of democratic processes in
some labor unions,1 resulted in the enactment of Title I of the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA), 2 also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. Title I of the

LMRDA is frequently referred to as the bill of rights for union
members. This bill of rights assures union members equal rights
the union electoral process and at union meetings,$ the right
free speech and assembly,4 freedom from arbitrary imposition
dues, initiation fees, and assessments, 5 the right to participate

in
of
of
in

litigation,6 and procedural due process safeguards against improper
disciplinary action.7

The right of free speech, guaranteed by section 101(a)(2) 8 of
1. Hearings conducted in the late 1950's by the Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor Management Field revealed "racketeering, corruption, abuse of
power, and other improper practices on the part of some labor organizations." 105 CONG.
REc. 6471 (1959).
The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field was established pursuant to S. Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). For a chronical of the activities and findings of the committee, see generallyHearings on the Investigation of Improper
Activities in the Labor Management Field Before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field, 85th & 86th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.
(1957-1960). See also R. KENDY, THE ENsMY WrrHIN (1960), for an inside view of the
Senate's investigation.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
3. LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1976).
4. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976).
5. LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1976).
6. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976).
7. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976).
8. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1976) provides:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertain-
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the LMRDA, is the most important right found in Title I. Free
expression is viewed as a means of achieving truth through competition in the "marketplace of ideas,"" and of leading governing
bodies toward democracy.10 A union member's right of free speech
allows him to question and criticize union management, and
thereby enhance the efficacy of other rights guaranteed' by the
LMRDA.
Recognition of the importance of free speech led to the enactment of a broad statutory guarantee for union members. 1 Accordingly, courts have interpreted section 101(a)(2) to protect a wide
range of union members' conduct. Such a result is demonstrated
by decisions that shield union members from discipline even when
they make libelous statements about union officials, 12 charge union
management with criminal conduct," and picket local union headquarters with signs disparaging the union leadership.14 A union
member's right of free speech, however, is not absolute. The proviso within section 101(a)(2) reflects Congressional recognition of
legitimate institutional interests of labor organizations." This proviso establishes a union's authority to make and enforce reasonable
rules of conduct, and allows unions freedom from interference with
the performance of legal and contractual obligations.
Ostensibly, section 101(a)(2) applies to all union members, including those elected or appointed to union office. Union officers,16
however, have responsibilities and obligations to union manageing to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed
to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules
as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
9. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. See generally J.S. MiLL, ON LmERTY 22-68 (1859).
11. See 105 CONG. REc. 6471 (1959).
12. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
13. Giordani v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.).
14. Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (D. Pa. 1963).
15. See Atleson, A Union Member's Right of Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional
Interests and Individual Rights, 51 MINN.L. REv. 403, 443-44 (1967).
16. The term "officer" as used in this Comment has a different meaning from the one
given to it in the LMRDA. See 29 U.S.C. 402(n) (1976). As used here, the term officer includes shop stewards, elected and appointed representatives, and salaried union staff members. Those members who occupy executive union positions, such as president and vicepresident, are generally referred to as "union management" in this Comment.
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ment that other members do not share. Consequently, most courts
draw a distinction between the extent of free speech protection
given an officer, and the protection afforded a non-officer member.
While all courts that have addressed this issue agree that an officer, as a union member, is entitled to protection of the membership rights 17 granted in Title I,'" they vary tremendously in the
amount of free speech protection they afford a member in his capacity as an officer.
Likewise, the approaches different circuit courts have used to
determine the amount of free speech protection afforded to a
union member who holds an office are as varied as the results they
have reached. For example, in 1963, the Second Circuit chose not
to distinguish between the degree of protection section 101(a)(2)
gives to a member within the union-member relationship and that
provided to a member within the union-officer relationship."9 Subsequently, the Second Circuit changed its approach, and recently
developed an analysis that clarifies the parameters of a member's
free speech right within the union-officer relationship.20 The development of this analysis should facilitate resolution of future controversies involving a union member's discharge from office.
17. Membership rights as defined by this Comment include those rights guaranteed by
Title I to all members. Thus, an officer's status as a member (as opposed to his status as an
officer) may not be arbitrarily infringed due to his exercise of any right guaranteed by Title
I.
18. See, e.g., Martire v. Laborers'-Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 903 (1969); Sazhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445.
19. In Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, the Second Circuit determined that the
plaintiff's discharge from office and suspension from participation in union activities for five
years violated section 101(a)(2). Plaintiff, financial secretary of his union local, had been
disciplined for distributing a leaflet that accused the local's president of financial improprieties. The district court denied plaintiff's request for an injunction, but the Second Circuit
reversed, directing the district court to assess damages and to enjoin the union from carrying out any punishment imposed on the plaintiff. 316 F.2d at 451.
Although its order was vague, it is apparent that the circuit court not only intended to
restore the plaintiff's full membership rights, but also to return him to office. The plaintiff,
however, never actually returned to liis post as financial secretary because shortly after the
litigation he suffered a stroke and later died. The conclusion, however, is supported by
Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This was an action for damages brought
by the administrator of the officer's estate. The district court awarded damages in the
amount of the plaintiff's lost salary as financial secretary from the time he was removed
from office by the union until the date his term of office expired. 290 F. Supp. at 681.
20. See Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973), and more recently Newman v.
Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978), discussed at
text accompanying notes 84-113 infra.
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This Comment focuses on the extent the LMRDA protects a
union officer from removal from office and the various approaches
used by different federal circuit courts when confronted with this
issue. Attention will be given to relevant legislative history of the
LMRDA, and the intertwined policy considerations. These considerations include protection of unions' institutional interests, as
well as the promotion of union democracy through the protection
of free speech.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The breadth of the language of Title I, and its failure to distinguish between union members in general and those members
who are also officers, leads to confusion about the extent of protection Congress provided to union members. The ambiguous language is attributed to political compromises needed to secure majority support and to the fact most of the bill was written on the
floor of the Senate.2 1 Unfortunately, for those attempting to interpret and apply the broad language of Title I, these same factors
resulted in a legislative history devoid of careful committee consid22
eration in either house of Congress.
The initial labor reform bills 23 drafted in the late 1950's dealt

primarily with financial and electoral controls, and lacked a union
members' bill of rights provision. 24 During the Senate's consideration of S. 1555 in 1959, Senator McClellan, chairman of the Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management
Field, offered a "bill of rights" amendment similar to one he had
introduced in an earlier bill.25 The Senate passed the McClellan
amendment by a single vote, 26 but the amendment quickly became
the center of. controversy, with opposition coming from many
21. Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1960).
22. The legislative history of the LMRDA, and Title I in particular, has been discussed
in depth in numerous articles. See, e.g., Atleson, supra note 15; Cox, supra note 21; Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199
(1960).
23. See S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
24. Such a bill of rights provision had been advocated by the American Civil Liberties
Union, see Rothman, supra note 22, at 204.
25. See S. 1137, 86th Cng., 1st Sess. (1959).
26. 105 CONG. Rc. 6492-93 (1959).
MICH.
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sources for a variety of reasons.27 Within two days a compromise
was drafted with "haste and stress,"2 and was introduced by Senator Kuchel as a substitute for the McClellan amendment. The
Kuchel amendment, later to become Title I of the LMRDA, was
passed overwhelmingly.29 In the House, the Landrum-Griffin bill
incorporated the Senate's Kuchel amendment,30 and was passed on
the House floor as a substitute for a committee-approved bill.3 1
The manner in which this legislation was enacted led one commen-

tator to conclude that "courts would be well advised to seek out
placing great emphasis upon close
the underlying rationale without
32

construction of the words.

The difficulty in determining the extent of free speech protection that Congress intended to afford a union member as an officer

arises from absence of committee consideration and lack of any detailed discussion of this issue on the floor of either house of Con-

gress. The limited amount of discussion on the Senate floor relevant to the issue of officers' free speech indicates a Congressional
desire to protect the right of union officers to criticize and oppose
union leadership as a means of promoting union democracy.3 3 This
27. Opposition to the McClellan amendment came from Southerners who feared that
the enforcement of private rights through governmental injunctions would set a bad precedent for the upcoming civil rights legislation. Some feared that the amendment's language
would be given its literal meaning by sympathetic courts. See Cox, supranote 21, at 832-33.
Others opposed the amendment because they felt state laws and existing federal legislation
better protected the private rights guaranteed in the amendment. See Rothman, supra note
22, at 206.
28. Cox, supra note 21, at 833.
29. 105 CONG. REc. 6727 (1959).
30. Under parliamentary law the conferees were powerless to revise the bill of rights
since there were no differences between the Senate and House bills. See Cox, supra note 21,
at 833; Atleson, supra note 15, at 409 n.27.
31. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
32. Cox, supra note 21, at 852.
33. During the Senate discussions of Title I, for example, Senator Mundt recalled an
incident involving the Operating Engineers Union. A local union president, who had fought
corrupt elements in the union for two years, was expelled from the union by the executive
board of the international union. Senator Mundt characterized this action as an attempt "to
"Senator Mundt went on to
circumvent freedom of speech on the part of the local ....
express his belief that the proposed bill of rights would facilitate "the present-day leaders of
labor, who want to have honesty in their union," in their efforts to reform their unions. 105
CONG. REc. 6478 (1959).
The plight of union officers who voice criticism of union leaders was brought to the attention of the Senate by Senator Goldwater. In support of the McClellan "Bill of Rights,"
Goldwater read a letter from a court-appointed monitor, who had been named to clean up
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters:
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history, however, fails to offer conclusive evidence as to whether
the provisions of section 101(a)(2) protect an officer from removal
from office or whether this section merely protects an officer's
membership rights.
In contrast, the legislative history of Title I is clear, and has
produced consistent results in one area-the scope of protection
for officers under section 101(a)(5). Section 101(a)(5) safeguards
union members against summary disciplinary action:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or
by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written
specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.u

Like section 101(a)(2), the language of section 101(a)(5) does not
explicitly distinguish between rights of members and those of officers. Courts, however, have uniformly agreed that the procedural
safeguards of section 101(a)(5) do not apply when an officer is discharged or suspended from office. A basis for this distinction is
found in the House Conference Report: "[T]he prohibition on suspension without observing certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer in the union."3 6 A further
statement of legislative intent was provided by Senator John F.
Kennedy, who as a Senate conferee advised the Senate that "all
the conferees agreed that this provision does not relate to suspension or removal from union office. Often this step must be taken
One of the most rampant abuses of the power in the labor movement, consists in
the practice of visiting reprisals upon union members and officials who dare to
exercise free speech in opposition to the wishes of the programs of powerful labor leaders. . .. The labor boards have with great solicitude, pursued employers
who make use of reprisals against workers. The law should forbid the much more
ruthless and extensive reprisals by labor leaders against the rank-and-file members and officers. 105 CONG. REc. 6488 (1959) (emphasis added).
34. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1976).
35. Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061
(1976); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Air
Line Stewards v. Transport Workers Union of America, 334 F.2d 805 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 972 (1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d

152 (3rd Cir. 1962).
36.

H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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summarily to prevent dissipation or misappropriation of funds. 3 7
This piece of legislative history has had the result of denying officers the protections of section 101(a)(5) even when fiscal misconduct was not a cause for removal from office.3 8 This interpretation
is unfortunate; when fiscal misconduct is not present there is no
logical reason to limit the procedural safeguards of section
101(a)(5) to an officer's membership status, rather than his status
as an officer.
The conclusion that section 101(a)(5) only applies to an officer's membership status raises the question of whether a similar
interpretation of section 101(a)(2) is appropriate. Does an officer
receive protection from section 101(a)(2) when he is summarily removed from office, a situation in which section 101(a)(5) would offer no procedural protection, or does section 101(a)(2) only protect
an officer from acts of reprisal which strip him of the incidents of
union membership? If one within the union-officer relationship is
afforded substantive protection under section 101(a)(2), should
this section protect an officer who advocates the overthrow of the
union government, or only an officer who voices constructive suggestions for changes in union policy? Courts are forced to answer
these questions without any Congressional guidance. Because it is
clear that officers have no procedural protection against arbitrary
removal from office, section 101(a)(2) provides the only recourse
for a union member removed from office for the exercise of his free
speech right. Hence, the substantive protection that section
101(a)(2) gives to a member within the union-officer relationship
takes on added significance.

11. ENFORCEMENT OF

SUBSTANTIVE
SPEECH RIGHTS BY OFFICERS

FREE

Like any other union member seeking to enforce individual
rights, an officer must first exhaust internal union remedies.3 9 Hav37. 105 CONG. REc. 17,899 (1959).
38. See, e.g., Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1061 (1976); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S 960
(1974).
39. An officer must exhaust internal union remedies or be able to justify his failure to
exhaust such remedies. In Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d
815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976), the court held that if a trial court determines that requiring exhaustion of internal remedies would be futile or inadequate, the trial court may choose not
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ing satisfied this requirement, a discharged officer may seek redress
under section 102 of the LMRDA in federal district court, or may
file an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board.40
Section 10241 is the enforcement mechanism for those rights
guaranteed to union members in Title I of the LMRDA. An alternative provision of the LMRDA also protects the rights guaranteed
in Title I. Section 609, found in Title VI of the LMRDA, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop
steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee
thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act.
The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this
m
section.

Thus, officers whose Title I rights are violated under either section
102 or section 609 may bring an action under section 102 for appropriate relief.43 Most officers who have sought redress for a disto require an exhaustion of remedies. See also Bradford v. Textile Workers of America,
Local 1093, 563 F.2d 1138, 1140 (4th Cir. 1977); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974) (union officers not required to exhaust internal
union remedies which promise to be fruitless).
40. Perhaps it is the time and cost constraints involved in a suit brought under section
102 of the LMRDA that leads some union officers to seek relief by filing an unfair labor
practice with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides that a labor organization commits an unfair
labor practice when it restrains or coerces an employee in the exercise of his organizational
rights, guaranteed under section 7 of that Act.
Although the NLRB administrative proceeding offers advantages, such as less expense
and delay, discharged officers have not fared as well before the NLRB as they have in court
under section 102 in obtaining reinstatement to office. This result can be attributed to the
lack of explicit protection within section 7 of the speech that section 101(a)(2) of the
LMRDA protects. For further discussion of the standard that the NLRB employs in officer
discharge cases, see note 102 infra.
41. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976) provides:
Any persofi whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of
the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as'may be appropriate.
Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district
court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred,
or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.
42. LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1976).
43. Union officers are entitled td and have received the same remedies that other union
members have received under section 102. For a discussion of the remedies available to
union members, see Christensen, Union Discipline Under Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in an IndustrialDemocracy, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 227, 258 (1968); Etelson & Smith,
Union Discipline Under the Landrum-GriffinAct, 82 H~nv. L. REv. 727, 754 (1969); Coin-
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charge from office have, as a matter of general pleading, alleged
violations of both section 609 and section 102. 44
A question that naturally arises in union officers' lawsuits
under section 609 is whether a removal from union office constitutes "discipline" within the meaning of this section. If an officer is
removed from office for exercising a Title I right, and the removal
is considered discipline, the union's action is in violation of the
LMRDA. This analysis, however, should be. unnecessary because
section 609 merely overlaps section 102 and is not essential to re45 Nevertheless, courts will be forced to
dress violations of Title I.
consider this analysis as long as discharged officers continue to allege violations of section 609.
Generally, courts have been consistent within a single case in
finding that a cause of action can be maintained for violations of
both sections 609 and 102. One court, however, has distinguished
between an action under section 609 and one under section 102
when brought in the same case. In Miller v. Holden," the Fifth
Circuit held that a discharge from office could not constitute a violation of section 609, but could be a violation of section 102. The
plaintiff had alleged that he was discharged from his position as
union trading coordinator in retaliation for his support of an unsuccessful candidate for business manager of the union local.
Asked to determine whether the district court had properly dismissed the complaint, the Fifth Circuit held that a removal from
employment could not constitute "discipline" within the meaning
of section 609 because unlawful "discipline" under section 609 is
limited to punishment that affects a union member only in his capacity as a member. 47 The court found, however, that the comment, Title I of the LMRDA. Rights and Remedies of Union Members With Respect to
Their Unions, 11 WmLAMmTrE L.J. 258, 276 (1974).
44. The legislative history of the LMRDA is unclear as to what the relationship between sections 609 and 102 was intedded to be. By adding the last sentence to section 609,
Congress provided private suits for violations of section 609. Thus, a fine, suspension, expulsion or other discipline imposed.for the exercise of a right protected by Title I can be enjoined in federal court by establishing a violation of section 609 or 102.
45. Atleson, supra note 15, at 483-84. Section 609 is not totally superfluous, however,
since it is significant in protecting the rights of members to seek, remedies for violations of
the trusteeship and election provisions of the LMRDA. See Etleson & Smith, supra note 43,
at 729 n.9.
46. 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
47. Id. at 914-15. After noting that the legislative history was "unenlightening," the
court felt free to construe its own definition of discipline. Id.
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plaint had been improperly dismissed because it did state a valid
cause of action under section 102 for the infringement of plaintiff's
section 101(a)(2) rights. The court held that jurisdiction under section 102 is not limited to those cases where a union member is
punished or disciplined only in his capacity as a member. Rather,
section 102 provides "jurisdiction to redress any union action
which infringes the rights protected by Title 1.' 4s Not every circuit,
however, interprets section 102 to provide jurisdiction to redress a
removal from union office. 9
1I.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF MEMBERS' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS TO
THE UNION-OFFICER RELATIONSHIP

In determining whether section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA protects a union officer from discharge for the exercise of free speech,
a court must first consider whether a union member retains his
Title I membership rights when he becomes an officer. If these
membership rights are applied, the issue then becomes whether
the particular removal is a statutory violation. Several approaches
have been used to establish the degree of protection section
101(a)(2) affords a union member in his capacity as an officer. The
case law of different circuits, while presenting conflicting positions,
reflects a gradual development of an analytical framework in which
officers' free speech rights have been examined. Not all courts,
however, have adopted an analytical analysis, that is, an examination of the particular facts of each officer's free speech case. Instead, some circuits resolve the issue of officers' free speech with
the application of mechanical or per se rules that operate notwithstanding the facts of a particular case.
A.

Use of Per Se Rules in Determining the Scope of
Free Speech Protection for Officers

The Third Circuit has'formulated a per se xule that discharge
from union office does not violate either section 102 or 609. In
48. Id. at 916. The court felt that extension of jurisdiction under section 102 to provide
a remedy for removal from office or employment was the logical result of its earlier recognition in Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445
F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972), that a member retains his Title
I rights despite his dual capacity as a member and a union officer or employee.
49. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1962), discussed at text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.

DISCHARGE OF UNION OFFICERS
Sheridan v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 626,50 an
elected business agent alleged that his union local had violated section 609 by removing him from office for exercising his section
101(a)(4) right to sue.5 1 The circuit court determined that "disci-

pline," as used in section 609, does not include removal from union
office. The court noted that "fine," "suspend," and "expel," other
terms used in section 609, 'manifest a congressional intent to protect union members in their membership status only, and removal

from office does not affect membership status.2 It was not solely
the court's technical construction of section 609, however, that defeated the plaintiff's action. The court also dismissed the section

102 charge stating, "[ilt is the union-member relationship, not the
union-officer or union-employee relationship that is protected" 53
by Title I. This reasoning precludes a discharged officer from
bringing an action under section 102 for infringement of a Title I
right. While other circuits have managed to avoid a discussion of
Sheridan by distinguishing it on a variety of grounds," the Third
Circuit has indicated that it would adhere to this case to deny redress to an officer who alleges he has been removed from office for
50. 306 F.2d 152 (3rd Cir. 1962).
51. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1976) provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any
member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate
with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of
time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof: And provided further,
That no interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly
finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition. (emphasis original).
52. 306 F.2d at 156.
53: Id. at 157.
54. Sheridan has been distinguished chiefly on two grounds. First, its view of the section 609 term "discipline', was only the opinion of Judge Kalodner who wrote the opinion.
However, Judge Kalodner's view received the entire support of the Third Circuit in Martire
v. Laborers' Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). Second,
Sheridan has been distinguished because of its facts; the plaintiff's removal was approved
by a vote of the union's membership. See, e.g., Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
King, 335 F.2d 340, 347 n.31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
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the exercise of his free speech rights. 5
One of the earliest cases to explicitly extend the guarantees of
section 101(a)(2) to the union-officer relationship did so through
an interpretation of section 609 that was in direct contrast to the
interpretation derived in Sheridan. In Grand Lodge of the InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. King,5 6 the Ninth Circuit examined section 609 and determined that a discharge from office is
"discipline" within the meaning of the statute. 57 In King six appointed officers brought a suit against the union for reinstatement
as union representatives after they were discharged for actively
supporting the losing candidate in a union election. Central to the
circuit court's holding was its determination that a member does
not forfeit the protections of section 101(a)(2) when he becomes an
officer. Having the same free speech protections as every other
member of the union, an officer may not be disciplined, that is,
removed from office, for exercising these rights.5 8 To hold otherwise would mean that "the members thus exposed to reprisal
would be those whose uninhibited exercise of freedom of speech
and assembly is most important to effective democracy in union
government." 59
King does not stand for the proposition that newly elected officials may not as a matter of established policy replace lower
ranking officers appointed by the previous administration. The
55. In Harrison v. Local 54, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 518 F.2d
1276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1042 (1975), the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
a complaint brought under section 102 for the infringement of section 101(a)(2). The plaintiff, a union local president, alleged he had been wrongfully removed from office by the
district council because of his efforts to prevent another local and the district council from
infringing on the jurisdiction of his local. The court held that the complaint should be dismissed because it failed on the facts to establish an infringement of section 101(a)(2). The
court further determined, however, that it would not reinstate plaintiff to his office even if a
basis for a claim existed under section 101(a)(2). The court stated that neither section 102
nor section 609 affords a remedy for removal from union office since Title I rights are not
applicable to the union-officer relationship. Id. at 1281-82.
56. 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
57. It is interesting to note that the court held that the term "discipline" as used in the
procedural due process provisions of section 101(a)(5) does not include removal from union
office. According to the court "it is . . .common experience that identical words may be
used in the same statute, or even in the same section of a statute with different meanings."
335 F.2d at 344.
58. In its discussion of section 609 and the meaning of discipline, the court noted its
recognition of Sheridan, but disregarded it on the grounds that Judge Kalodner's view of
discipline was not accepted by other members of the court. Id. at 347 n.31.
59. Id. at 345.
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court simply held that an officer may not be removed from office
,for exercising the free speech rights granted to him by section
101(a)(2). The court suggested that a union might impose reasonable limitations on the political activity of union officers under the
"reasonable rules and regulations" proviso of section 101(a)(2).60
This requires a union to formulate a policy of political neutrality
among officers, as an "element of efficiency," and apply it without
discrimination. 1
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 609 represents a
per se or mechanical protection of an officer's free speech rights, in
that the court's decision does not depend on an analysis of the
facts of the case. As late as 1976, the court applied the rationale of
King and expanded it by holding that it is unlawful "discipline" to
reassign a union officer to another job location in retaliation for his
intra-union political activity. In Cooke v. Orange Belt District
Council of PaintersNo. 48,6 2 the plaintiff was reelected as a business representative of his union. In that election he supported the
losing candidate for the post of Executive Secretary. Shortly after
the election, the new Executive Secretary reassigned the plaintiff
to a desert location 167 miles from his residence. While the Ninth
Circuit did not focus on the motivation for the alleged discipline in
King, it stated in Cooke that a job reassignment must be retaliatory to constitute unlawful discipline. To demonstrate this, a
plaintiff must prove that the reassignment "reasonably cannot be
related to a legitimate desire of the elected officials to secure a
structure of job reassignments that will permit them to manage the
union in accordance with the mandate of their election." 6 It is unclear whether this standard was devised in this case because the
court did not view a job reassignment as being as serious a violation as a removal from office, or because the court was retreating
from the per se rule developed in King and moving toward an emphasis on the particular facts of a case. Such a step would reflect
the progression toward an analytical examination of each complaint that some other circuits have made.8 '
60. For a more thorough discussion of the proviso to section 101(a)(2) and its role in
free speech litigation, see Atleson, supra note 15, at 443.
61. 335 F.2d at 346. In King, the union had not formulated such a policy.
62. 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. Id. at 819.
64. See, e.g., Newman v. Communications Workers of Am., Local 1101, 570 F.2d 439
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The result in King, and in subsequent cases that followed its
rationale, has been criticized for employing one-sided analyses and
ignoring considerations of union solidarity and effectiveness."5 It is
feared that these decisions are likely to have an adverse impact on
unions, because when "leadership is prohibited from removing
those who have expressed philosophical disagreements with them
and have manifested a lack of personal loyalty, the leadership cannot be effective.""0 As an alternative to decisions that fail to make
any real analysis, some critics have suggested that a range of factors be examined to determine the amount of protection to extend
87
a removed officer.
Criticism concerning a lack of analysis applies equally as well
to the Third Circuit's decision in Sheridan.es Although both Sheridan and King were decided on interpretations of section 609, opposite results were reached. In both situations the section 609 term
"discipline" was construed to legitimize a preconceived conclusion
about union members' free speech; a conclusion the courts applied
notwithstanding the interests in favor of union democracy in a particular case. Instead of judging each case on its facts, as recommended in members' free speech cases, 9 these courts use their respective interpretations of "discipline" as a means to either
broadly protect officers' speech, or to leave it unprotected.
A further example of courts' use of per se rules has arisen
where the plaintiff is an appointed officer. The Fifth Circuit has
adopted a rule that appointed officers may be removed from office
at any time without violating the LMRDA.70 In Wambles v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters & Chauffeurs,71 the Fifth Cir(2d Cir. 1978); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. See Beaird and Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REv.
577, 585-88 (1973).
66. Id. at 587.
67. Professors Beaird and Player have suggested that a court "analyze the position,
duties, and responsibilities" of an officer who has been discharged from office. They have
also suggested that in some cases a compromise may be reached by demoting an officer
rather than completely discharging him. Id. at 887-88.
68. For a discussion of Sheridan see text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
69. Kroner, Title I of the LMRDA: Some Problems of Legal Method and Mythology,
43 N.Y.U. L. REv.280, 304 (1968).
70. No other circuit court has established such a rule. But see Wood v. Dennis, 489
F.2d 849, 856, and 858 (concurring opinion) (7th Cir. 1973).
71. 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974). In Wambles, several appointed officers alleged that
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cuit relied upon broad assumptions about the proper functions of
appointed officers to determine that the union hierarchy may summarily remove appointed officers for the exercise of their free
speech rights.72 While replacement of appointed officers may, at
times, be necessary to maintain union solidarity, the adoption of
such an absolute rule deprives these officers of an opportunity to
demonstrate their loyalty and ability to effectively implement
union policies. Alternatively, an officer's status and position in the
union should be included in an analysis of the facts in each case.
An officer's status should not, in light of the broad guarantees of
section 101(a)(2), dominate the issue of whether a removal from
office violates the LMRDA.
B.

Development of a Fact-Based Analysis
of Officers' Free Speech Rights

Not all courts considering the scope of rights section 101(a)(2)
affords union members who hold office have decided the issue
through application of per se rules. Some courts have tried to
detemine the impact of an officer's activity on union solidarity and
democracy through an analysis of the particular facts presented in
each case. In Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the InternationalAssociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,73 for example, the
plaintiff brought an action under section 102 after he was discharged as union representative for expressing opposition to an executive council proposal. The circuit court held that the plaintiff's
action was essentially for personal injury rather than for breach of
contract, and as such, was barred by the applicable state statute of
limitations. 74 Additionally, the court reasoned that apart from the
statutory bar the plaintiff had no right to relief under the facts of
the case. 75 The court determined that the right of free speech, as
well as other rights protected by Title I, operates to the benefit of
their section 101(a)(2) rights were violated when they were removed from their positions for
supporting the losing candidate in their union's election of a business manager.
72. The Fifth Circuit had earlier held in Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971), that both elected and
appointed officials retain their free speech rights when they become officers. Id. at 550. The
Fifth Circuit's Wambles decision apparently does not affect elected officers.
73. 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
74. Id. at 549-50.
75. Id. at 550.

184

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

every union member, and that a member does not lose these statutory rights when he becomes an officer.7 0 After establishing that
officers retain these rights, the court limited them:
This conclusion [that all members are entitled to the right of free speech]
. . .does not permit an employee who accepts employment for the perform-

ance of certain specified duties to take the largesse and pay of the union, on
the one hand, and on the other to completely subvert the purposes of his
employment by engaging in77activities diametrically opposed to the performance of his specified duties.

Applying this consideration to the factual pattern of this case, 8
the court reasoned that if a union was prohibited from discharging
an officer for insubordination, the result would seriously detract
from effective and cohesive union leadership, and would lead to
"weak, ineffective and fragmented unions which would be
paralysed in bargaining for the rights and welfare of union mem9
bers . . .
Another example of a departure from the application of per se
0 In Wood,
rules is found in Wood v. Dennis.8
an officer brought an
action under section 609 alleging that he was removed from office
for exercising his free speech right. Asked to determine whether
the district court properly dismissed the complaint, the Seventh
Circuit held that the complaint stated a claim under Title I. The
court, however, did not resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff's
removal from office constituted "discipline" under section 609.
This question, in the court's opinion, was best left to an evidentiary hearing.81
The circuit court cautioned trial courts that the goal of union
democracy cannot be advanced if union members must forfeit their
Title I rights on becoming officers.8 2 But the court also expressed
76. Id.
77. Id. at 550-51.

78. A further examination of the facts suggests that the court's analysis in this case
may not be as objective as it appears. The facts demonstrate that the plaintiff was attempting to insure rank and file participation in the union by his opposition to the executive
council's proposal. The proposal sought to eliminate from the union's constitution the requirement that all proposed amendments to the constitution must be submitted for the
approval of the rank and file. The conclusion that this activity is "insubordination" could
abrogate much of the protection that the court afforded to officers under section 101(a)(2).
79. 445 F.2d at 551-52.
80. 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
81. Id. at 854.
82. Id.
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approval of the limitation imposed on these rights in Sewell.8"
Stating it was "not unmindful of the fine line which must be drawn
between what might be termed insubordination on the one hand
and freedom of speech on the other,"8 the court determined that
such a line should not be drawn until substantial factual material
is considered.8 5 In contrast to those courts whose opinions merely
formalize preconceived results, Wood, like Sewell, suggests that
resolution of a case should depend on its particular facts.
C.

The Newman Case -

A Fact-Based Analysis

The Second Circuit's decision in Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America,8 went a step further than Wood
and Sewell by developing a flexible analysis that may be useful in
resolving future controversies. The Second Circuit developed an
analytical framework by indicating the facts relevant to the issue
of officers' free speech.
In Newman, the only action taken by the defendant, Local
1101, was removal of the plaintiff from his position as union steward. The plaintiff brought an action alleging violations of sections
102 and 609 in order to obtain reinstatement and enjoin Local 1101
from disciplining any of its members for exercising the rights protected by Title I. It was undisputed that the plaintiff had openly
and actively worked for more democratization of the local, and had
done so in opposition to the local's leadership. The district court
concluded that the plaintiff was discharged from office because he
had written an article critical of the local's leadership, which appeared in a publication distributed by and for union members at
his jobsite.8 7 Based on this finding, the district court held that the
local had violated section 609,88 and granted a preliminary injunc83. Id. at 856. See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra.
84. Id. at 855-56.
85. The court justified the Fifth Circuit's resolution of a case on a motion to dismiss in

Sewell because the Fifth Circuit had "the benefit of substantial additional undisputed factual information." Id. at t56.
86. 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 444.
88. Id. The district court's discussion of section 609 resembles the analysis in Wood
rather than the per se approach exemplified by King. It is obvious that the district court
examined the facts presented. For example, the court found that the plaintiff was qualified
for the steward's job and that the plaintiff's removal tended to chill other members' speech.

Id.
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tion ordering plaintiff's reinstatement.
The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings.8 9 The court began its
analysis by establishing that "[a]s a member of the union a union
official or employee, of course, enjoys the rights guaranteed by
[the] LMRDA .
. ",.9
The court then attempted to strike a balance between the right of an officer to be critical of the union's
leadership and the right of a union to maintain strength and solidarity. The court's analysis, however, clearly stressed the duties
and obligations an officer owes to his union and its leadership. Discussing this responsibility, the court stated:
Although a person is free as a union member to criticize mercilessly his
union's management and its policies, once he accepts a union position obligating him fairly to explain or carry out the union's policies or programs, he
may not engage in conduct inconsistent with these duties without risking removal as an official or employee (but not as a union member) on the ground
that his conduct precludes his effective representation of the union. 1

The court concluded that an inquiry must be made in each case to
determine whether an officer's speech bars his effective performance as a representative of the union's management, and whether
his removal prevents him or others from exercising their rights as
union members under Title I2 Three factors were recommended
and implicitly used by the court for making such an inquiry: the
nature of the union position in question, the extent of the allegedly
unlawful discipline, and the motivation behind the removal.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's determination that Local 1101 had to prove disruptive conduct on the
plaintiff's part in order to remove him from office. Instead, the
court determined that a plaintiff must provide "clear and convincing proof that the union action.. . was 'part of a purposeful and
deliberate attempt by union officials to suppress dissent within the
union' ,s in order to establish a violation of the LMRDA. Accordingly, the court held that the "plaintiffs were required to show that
the purpose was, or effect of decertifying Newman as a job steward
would be, to inhibit or stifle his exercise of free speech rights as a
89.
90.
91.
.92.
93.

570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 445-46 quoting Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973).
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union member.

'1 4

Based on affidavits filed in district court by the

parties, the court made two significant findings, 95 which according
to its analysis justified plaintiff's removal. The first was that the
"removal was justified on the ground that his conduct precluded
him from functioning effectively as an agent of the Local management ......

"96 The

second finding was that "neither the purpose

nor effect of the decertification was to chill or inhibit his free
speech rights as a union member.

97

On remand in district court, an amended complaint was filed
and a two day nonjury trial was held. 8 The trial judge granted the
requested relief, reinstating the plaintiff to his position as union
steward and enjoining the management of Local 1101 from enforcing its stated policy of decertifying any union steward who refused
to renounce the right to publish in opposition to the union's administration. Central to the holding were the findings that the
plaintiff's conduct did not preclude him from functioning effectively as an agent of Local 1101, and that there was clear and convincing proof that the purpose and effect of the decertification was
to stifle the plaintiff and other members from exercising their right
to speak out against the local's management.99 The Second Circuit
94. Id. at 466 (emphasis added). The court's opinion is unclear as to whether the plaintiff also bears the burden of proving that his conduct has not prevented the effective performance of his union duties. The opinion also leaves unsettled what result will be reached
when the plaintiff proves that the purpose or effect of his removal was to inhibit his exercise
of free speech, but the facts demonstrate that his conduct bars his effective performance as
a union representative.
Perhaps the most important issue left unanswered by the Second Circuit is whether
proof of a chilling effect on a discharged officer's speech alone constitutes a violation of
section 101(a)(2), or whether proof of a chilling effect on the union membership is required.
The latter may be inferred from the court's requirement that there must be clear and convincing proof "of a purposeful and deliberate attempt by union officials to suppress dissent
within the union." 570 F.2d at 445-46.
95. Since the only facts presented to the district court and to the Second Circuit on
appeal were the affidavits filed by the parties in district court, the Second Circuit determined that it was "in as good a vantage point as [the district court] to appraise the sufficiency of the proof." 570 F.2d at 446 n.4.
96. Id. at 447.
97. Id.
98. Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, 99 L:R.R.M. 2755
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The same day that the Second Circuit reversed the district court's preliminary injunction, Local 1101 again removed the plaintiff from his union steward position.
The amended complaint reflected this action by the local. Id. at 2757 n.1.
99. Id. at 2757.
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affirmed,100 based on its determination that the district court's
findings were not clearly erroneous and that the standards the circuit court had earlier prescribed were complied with.
Newman is the first officers' free speech case where a court
approached the merits through an inquiry based on objective factors.101 The flexibility of this analysis is demonstrated by the Second Circuit's different holdings in the two Newman appeals when
presented with different factual findings. A problem with the
court's analysis, however, is that it gives too little emphasis to officers' free speech as a means of promoting internal union democracy. The court discussed at length the plaintiff's institutional responsibilities as an agent of the union, but failed to mention the
plaintiff's role as an elected representative of the membership. It
also neglected to note that a representative may at times serve the
best interests of the electorate by being vehemently critical of the
union's management.
The Second Circuit's oversight thus poses practical problems
for a union officer who criticizes or opposes his union's management. Although the plaintiff in Newman was successful in obtaining reinstatement, the court's analysis places a demanding burden of proof on other officers seeking similar relief. The court's
oversight, whether intentional or not, results in overprotection of
union solidarity at the expense of union democracy. It is this same
emphasis upon union solidarity which has led the National Labor
Relations Board to deny redress to union officers who have been
removed from office. 02 Despite the absence of explicit statutory
100. Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers of America, 597 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1979).
101. Neither the court in Sewell nor the court in Wood reached the merits of their
respective cases. Both courts were asked only to review the dismissal of a complaint.
102. For a cursory discussion of how and why an officer would bring his case to the
attention of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) see note 40 supra. The most lucid
explanation of the NLRB's holdings in officer discharge cases is provided in Shenago Incorporated, 237 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1978). There the NLRB concluded that the union did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) when it removed a safety committee chairman because he supported
the losing candidate in an internal union election. The NLRB defined the issue as being one
of balancing the employee's section 7 right to engage in internal union affairs against the
union's interest in placing in office those it felt would best serve the union and its membership. Finding the union's interest controlling, the NLRB asserted that retention of an officer
hostile to the union's management could lead to union ineffectiveness or other undesirable
results. Id.
An officer, however, can expect the NLRB to find a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) when
his union removes him from office for filing an unfair labor practice charge against either his
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authorization, the principle of union solidarity remains well entrenched in federal labor law.1 03 Hence, federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board lend themselves to strengthening undemocratic union institutions in order to promote union
"effectiveness."
The Second Circuit's "purpose or effect" test demonstrates
this overprotection in Newman. Under this test, a removed officer
must provide clear and convincing proof that the purpose or effect
of his removal was 'to chill his free speech rights as a member after
his removal from office. Initially in Newman, the plaintiff was not
reinstated because the Second Circuit determined that after removal, the plaintiff "continued to exercise his free speech rights as
a member" 104 and "was entitled to all the rights of union membership, including . . . candidacy for union office .. . ,. On remand, however, the plaintiff demonstrated that after his removal,
his free speech right as a union member was chilled due to Local
1101's stated policy that barred from office any member who published anything critical of the local's management. The district
court concluded that this policy had the effect of inhibiting the
plaintiff from exercising his free speech rights as a member because running for office is an incident of union membership.1 0 6
Without the existence of such a policy, it would be virtually impossible to show that the effect or purpose of a removal from office is
to chill a member's speech after his removal. The union leadership's intent in many situations may not extend to inhibiting an
officer's speech after his removal from office; the leadership may be
employer or the union. In National Tea Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 773, 775 (1970), the NLRB held
that a discharge from office, under these circumstances, violates section 8(b)(1)(A) because
an officer, as a union member, has a statutory right to unimpeded access to the NLRB. In
Majestic Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 102 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1979), the NLRB found a violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A) when the union discharged a union steward from office, not for filing
an unfair labor practice, but for advising another employee to file a charge against the

union. The NLRB concluded that the removal constituted unlawful coercion because it adversely affected employee access to the NLRB. The NLRB further commented that it was
the absence of this restriction on employee access that led to its failure to find a violation in
Shenago Incorporated. Id. at 1504.
103. See Brooks, Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L. R.v. 344, 350

(1976).
104. 570 F.2d at 448. The court also refused to reinstate the plaintiff due to its finding
that "his conduct precluded him from functioning effectively as an agent of the local management." Id. at 447.

105. Id. at 448.
106. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2757-58.
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content to remove the officer from a position where his speech will
be most effective, and where he is likely to learn of mismanagement or the wrongdoings of union leaders.
The Second Circuit's neglect of the implications for union democracy is demonstrated by its failure to recognize that even
though an officer may speak freely after his discharge, the discharge itself has a chilling effect on the officer and the other members of his union. In Wood v. Dennis,10 7 the Seventh Circuit refuted the district court's determination that an officer dismissed
from office should not be reinstated because he could still enjoy his
free speech rights as a member. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
"suppression of freedom of speech is not limited to noninterference
with vocalization. Rights of communication cannot be so restricted
as to be meaningless."10 8 Emphasizing that a discharge from office
chills free speech, the court went on to state that the plaintiff "was
possessed of an effective voice as an officer. It cannot be said that
his freedom of speech as a member is unimpaired when that which
made his speech effective is removed for improper disciplinary reasons." 109 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning suggests that an inquiry
that only takes into consideration the ability to vocalize dissent
after removal from office is inadequate to protect the free speech
rights of union members who hold union office.
There may be some justification for the Second Circuit's emphasis on union solidarity and its neglect of the implications for
union democracy. Some commentators suggest that students of the
labor movement are preoccupied with issues of union democracy
and exclude consideration of other vital aspects of union administration, such as the disservice caused to union members by inefficient administration.110 These commentators believe that a union's
need to preserve its solidarity should allow it to enjoy certain prerogatives, even at the cost of internal democracy., There is, however, evidence to the contrary that despite union leaders' usual distaste for rank and file participation in internal affairs, this activism
actually strengthens the union. 112 It is generally recognized that
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

112.

489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 855.
Id.
D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 90 (1970).
Id. at 90-91.
A. ROSE, UNION SOLIDARITY 183-84 (1952).
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the flow of information and rank and file participation are essential
to guarantee union democracy. 113 One study of union democracy
found that as lower echelon officers were subjected to discipline in
the interest of union efficiency, their ability to function as a source
of expression for the rank and file became impaired. 1 4 This impairment is traced to a centralization of power in union management, creating an effective insulation from all opposition. 115 One
way to penetrate this insulation and promote a democratic union
structure is to allow officers the freedom to express dissent without
fear of a retaliatory discharge from office. Courts that address the
issue of officers' free speech face the difficult task of balancing the
interests of union democracy and union solidarity. These courts
must ask whether the significance the Second Circuit has placed on
union cohesiveness and stability comes at too high a cost.
CONCLUSION

Title I of the LMRDA, the bill of rights for union members,
was specifically designed to promote the "full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union."' " Courts that
employ a per se rule to deny the free speech protection of section
101(a)(2) to union members serving as union officers are not in accord with the underlying rationale of this legislation. Although the
legislative history establishes an officer-member dichotomy with
regard to the procedural protections of section 101(a)(5), there is
no basis for such a distinction with the substantive protection of
free speech. Consequently, a majority of circuit courts now reject
the proposition that the union-officer relationship is completely
unprotected by section 101(a)(2)." 7
Considerations of union stability and internal union democ113.

Cloke, Labor Democracy, Free Speech and the Right of Rank and File Insur-

gency, 4 U. SAN FsN. V. L. Rav. 1, 17 (1975).
114. S. LpmSr, M. TI ow & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 147 (1956).
115. A. COOK, UNION DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL 201-02 (1963).
116. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1964).
117. Bradford v. Textile Workers, 563 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Holden, 535
F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976), but see Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters & Chauffeurs,
488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), in regard to appointed officers; Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist.
Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061 (1976); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Price v. United Mine Workers, 376 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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racy are crucial in determining the scope of protection that section
101(a)(2) affords members' speech. These considerations become
even more compelling when the protection of members' speech
within the union-officer relationship is at issue. The relative weight
given these considerations should vary in accordance with the distinctive facts each case presents. Because of such variation in fact
patterns, the adoption of per se rules is inimical to both a union's
institutional interests and to internal union democracy. To accommodate these conflicting interests, courts must refrain from applying preconceived conclusions about members' speech and instead
analyze the facts of each case.
An example of such an analysis is found in Newman v. Local
1101, Communications Workers of America,115 where the Second
Circuit dealt with the issue of officers' free speech in a flexible,
fact-based analytical framework. The test 11 9 employed by the Second Circuit, however, is insufficient to protect an officer's right of
free speech. The court's determination that section 101(a)(2) is not
violated as long as a discharged officer can speak freely after his
discharge from office denies officers the protection necessary to
question and criticize the union's management and policies. Union
members are improperly denied guaranteed rights when a union is
permitted to retaliate for the exercise of free speech merely because a member becomes an officer. As one court stated:
[U]nion officers... have a greater obligation to speak up than do ordinary
members, because of the responsibility and prestige of their positions ....

To reduce [them] to silence through fear of disciplinary reprisal is tantamount to saying that the member who succeeds in becoming an official of the
union forfeits membership rights guaranteed to him by the LMRDA. 120
Courts, however, cannot adequately protect the relevant interests in officers' free speech cases unless they consider the consequences for union democracy and union stability in a given case.
To reach a fair accommodation between these conflicting interests,
a court must consider an officer's status and position in the union,
his effectiveness as an agent of both the union and the member118. 570 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 86-106 supra for a discussion of Newman.
119. See note 94 and accompanying text supra for elaboration on the test employed by
the Second Circuit in Newman. As discussed in note 94 supra,the test is far from lucid, and
may be subject to future litigation before the many uncertainties are resolved.
120. DeCampli v. Greeley, 293 F. Supp. 746, 752 (D.N.J. 1968).
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ship, and the extent to which a member's discharge from union
office is an attempt to stifle or inhibit his expression of views as an
officer. This factual analysis will enable courts to define the extent
of officers' free speech protection, while reconciling the relevant
considerations intertwined in this issue.
LARRY

P. MALFITANO

